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In order to operate effectively in the 1990s and beyond, the DoD must improve its 
management and business processes. To accomplish this, the DoD has just released its 
"Corporate Information Management (CIM) Strategic Plan for the 21st Century." A 
number of independent studies, relating to CIM, have also recently been completed. 
This paper compares and evaluates the CIM Strategic Plan, the independent studies, 
and recognized methodologies of reengineering large organizations. It addresses 
shortcomings of the CIM Strategic Plan and recommends modifications and additions. 
Notable among these recommendations is the need to gain support for the Strategic 
Plan at all levels of the DoD. Additional measures, such as establishing a National 
Military Advisory Council, will help institutionalize the plan at the DoD and ensure its 
effective implementation. 
Finally, this paper concludes that reengineering the DoD in accordance with a 
modified CIM Strategic Plan is feasible. 
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Why can the DoD not continue to conduct business as it has done in the past? Beyond 
simply stating the obvious, that the DoD will have to deal with dwindling resources, 
there are two arguments that support reengineering: the changing world political 
situation and the accelerating pace of technical innovation. 
For over 40 years the United States has built its defense around a threat that could 
demand a large-scale struggle for national survival. With the collapse of the former 
Soviet Union, this threat has been removed for the foreseeable future. While strategic 
deterrence remains a key foundation of the United States' National Military Strategy, the 
structure of its forces must change to meet smaller, regional conflicts. 
"The Military Technical Revolution," a report from the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS), found that "US military forces ought to be designed and 
their development prioritized with primary emphasis on regional conflicts." [Ref. 1 :p. 
8] The CSIS study reduces military operations to two basic types. The first, combined-
arms operations, consists of traditional, large-scale mechanized operations. Regional 
conflicts are included in this category of operations. 
The second type, irregular operations, includes peace enforcement, peacekeeping, 
and humanitarian relief. Even though priority is given to forces designed to fight 
regional conflicts, it is clear from current situations around the world that the role of 
the services have been broadened to fulfill these irregular operations. 
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While the "Bottom-Up Review" of the DoD addressed this reorganization, 
specifically outlining the force structure required to win two nearly simultaneous 
major regional conflicts, it is evident that the reduction in force size will call for 
dramatic changes in the way the services operate. Clearly the role of the DoD is changing 
to demand a smaller, more mobile, flexible, and less expensive force. The second, and 
less obvious, need for reengineering the DoD is the dynamic pace at which technology is 
changing. The lead time between the discovery of a new technology and its application is 
becoming progressively shorter [Ref. 2:p.18]. Daryl Conner, author of Managing at the 
Speed of Change, believes that the pace of change will continue to accelerate. He also 
believes that managers are now faced with the least amount of ambiguity they will see in 
their careers (see Figure 1-1). 
Key Characteristics of Accelerating Change: 
- Answers will be more sophisticated and less 
durable 
- More time spent "in between" rather than "in" 
familiar territory 
- No time outs, no substitutions 
Results: 
- Today's turmoil will appear 
tame by comparison 
- Success will not lead to 
stability, but to more change 
Figure 1-1 The Accelerating Pace of Change [Ref. 3:p. 3] 
The United States, in its next conflict, is likely to face a foe that is similarly armed 
with modern weapons. To increase the chances for successful outcomes, the United 
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States must remain a leader in the development and application of new technology. 
In order to maintain our technical superiority, the DoD must learn to do things 
differently. It must be able to do more with less resources, to reduce technology lead 
times, and to incorporate continuing change into its operations. The transformation of 
any large, inefficient bureaucracy into a flexible, dynamic, results-driven organization 
appears a challenging job. When that organization happens to be the DoD, many would 
call the task impossible. However, political realities, coupled with numerous current 
and potential conflicts throughout the world, demand that the DoD make dramatic 
changes. The current situation, with the reduction in resources, personnel downsizing, 
and expanding, diverse operations, presents not only a challenge but a unique 
opportunity for the DoD to become proactive in the formation of United States strategy, 
instead of responding to a perceived threat as it has since the end of World War II. As 
Secretary of Defense, William Perry, stated in his confirmation hearing: 
There always comes a moment in time when the door opens and lets the future 
in. For more than four decades the Defense Department has built its strategy and 
programs on dealing with the cold war. The ending of the cold war has opened a 
door, and the future is waiting to come in. By our actions, and by the new 
strategies we develop, we can shape the future instead of being shaped by it. 
[Ref. 4:p. 3] 
There is no question that the DoD needs to change in order to become an efficient, 
effective, proactive organization. To this end, reengineering in the DoD began five years 
ago under the title of the Corporate Information Management (CIM) initiative. The 
question now is whether or not DoD's CIM initiative and its latest creation, the CIM 
Strategic Plan, can provide the reengineering necessary to meet these goals. 
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8. OBJECTIVE 
The success of the CIM Strategic Plan will depend in large measure upon its broad 
dissemination throughout the DoD and its understanding by DoD members. The objective 
of this paper is to assist in this dissemination and understanding. To accomplish this 
objective, this paper will provide an in-depth description of the origin of the CIM 
initiative, the policies it has spawned, and its long-term goals. 
This paper will define the widespread changes currently taking place in private 
sector organizations, commonly referred to as reengineering. Reengineering requires 
dramatic and innovative redesign of the operations that are at the heart of every 
organization. 
And finally, the objective of this paper will be met by describing how the CIM 
initiative fits into the overall context of reengineering. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In order to meet this paper's objective, the following questions must be answered: 
What is the CIM Strategic Plan and what is its relationship to the broader CIM 
initiative? Does the Strategic Plan provide the necessary foundation for successful 
reengineering of the DoD? What resistance has CIM met in the DoD, and in what ways has 
it adapted in order to survive in a traditional, change-resistant organization? 
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The CIM initiative is not without controversy within the DoD. Just as reengineering 
has been dismissed by many private-sector organizations as the latest management fad, 
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so has CIM met with the same resistance within DoD. Because the implementation of CIM 
within the DoD is an ongoing effort, with continuing controversy and changes, it cannot 
be analyzed as a complete program. Instead, this paper will examine CIM from a 
strategic perspective as an external observer, learning from CIM's failures and 
successes. 
Reengineering began as a process of fundamentally changing the way businesses 
operate. It has since been applied to public sector operations as well. The assumption of 
this paper is that reengineering can achieve higher standards and increased efficiency, 
while reducing resources, and that these improvements can be applied to large, public 
sector organizations, and to the DoD in particular. 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY 
Because the CIM initiative is still relatively new, there is a limited amount of 
published information available. However, DoD directives, memos, and instructions are 
available to trace CIM's history. In addition, personal interviews have been conducted to 
gain more insight into what CIM is truly about and what resistance it has met. 
While the amount of published information on the CIM initiative is limited, there is, 
in the private sector, a wealth of published information available on the general topic of 
reengineering and business process redesign. All of these sources have been used to 
provide a clear understanding and analysis of CIM, by itself, and in the context of widely 
recognized theories of reengineering. 
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F. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Following this introduction, Chapter II will provide the necessary background on the 
CIM initiative, tracing it from inception in the late 80s to its current status. Chapter 
Ill introduces reengineering as practiced in the private sector. Through the examination 
of numerous studies, interviews, and reports, this chapter describes the most recent 
developments of the CIM initiative in the context of reengineering theories. Chapter IV is 
an analysis of the CIM initiative and includes descriptions of the major problems 
encountered in implementing this concept in DoD. Chapter V presents principles of 
change management in organizations, and demonstrates how this has been one of the 
major obstacles to the implementation of CIM within the DoD. Chapter VI, the final 
chapter, summarizes the several recommendations made throughout this paper and 
presents this paper's conclusions. 
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II. THE CORPORATE INFORMATION MANAGEMENT INITIATIVE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Before the CIM initiative can be correctly analyzed, it is necessary to understand the 
circumstances in which it became such a significant force in the DoD. This chapter 
traces the CIM initiative from its origins and foundation within the DoD to the recently 
released CIM Strategic Plan. It places emphasis on providing a basic understanding of 
CIM rather than looking to specific instructions, directives, or an all-encompassing 
memorandum that defines the CIM initiative. 
8. DoD's INFORMATION RESOURCE MANAGEMENT DILEMMA 
After World War II, the National Security Act of 1947 created a loose confederation 
among the services. Legislation passed through the 1950s and 1960s strengthened the 
role of the Secretary of Defense but did little to unite the services [Ref. 5:p. 198]. A 
series of conflicts from Vietnam to Desert I, the failed Iran hostage rescue mission, 
revealed the need for an effective joint doctrine. 
The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Act of 1986 may have been the first 
real attempt at meaningful reform and integration of the services. This legislation 
increased the responsibilities of the Chairman of the JCS and gave the CINCs direct 
access to the NCA, but it did little to end the partisanship demonstrated by the services. 
While Goldwater-Nichols appears to have been partially successful in reforming joint 
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doctrine, it did little to solve the problem of allocating resources among the services 
[Ref. 6:p. 72]. 
Recent conflicts such as Desert Storm represent marked improvements in joint 
operations, but problems still exist. Consequently, when the computer revolution 
matured in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the services worked independently to 
design, procure, and implement information systems. Compounding this enthusiastic 
acquisition was the Reagan Era military build-up, which provided funding for numerous 
programs despite duplication between the services and inefficient design, 
implementation, and management. In June of 1986, the Packard Commission criticized 
many of the DoD's management practices and its acquisition process. The Commission 
urged reforms in both of these critical areas [Ref. 7:p. 8]. 
Criticism from the legislative branch continued. In July of 1989, Congress, 
responding to GAO reports of mismanagement of automated data processing (ADP) 
systems in the DoD, threatened to cut funding for DoD information technology until the 
DoD produced a comprehensive, department-wide strategy for the acquisition and 
maintenance of its information resources. Specifically, the House Armed Services 
Committee recommended reducing the DoD Automated Data Processing (ADP) 
appropriation by $165.5 million for fiscal year 1990. The committee also 
recommended that: 
• All funds used for major information systems must be approved by the Major 
Automated Information Systems Review Council (MAISRC). 
• Proposed that expenditures for major automated information systems must 
include an economic analysis in support of the system, which shall be 
reviewed annually and submitted in the DoD budget to Congress. 
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• Any major administrative automated information system which is determined 
to be service-unique must be reported to the Armed Services Committee 
prior to any initial MAISRC milestone. 
• Each major, automated information system project that is submitted in the 
annual budget must include a current set of management indicators. 
• The DoD Comptroller and the Director of Operation Test and Evaluation 
(DOT&E) are charged with developing a quality assurance program for 
major, automated information systems. 
• The DoD Comptroller and the Defense Acquisition Board must report to 
Congress, within 90 days of a critical milestone, whether to use MAISRC for 
evaluation of computer systems in weapons programs. 
[Ref. 8:p. 181) 
The above recommendations resulted in a direction from President Bush in 1989 to 
completely overhaul the DoD's acquisition policies and management practices. In July of 
1989, in response to the president's directive, the Secretary of Defense, Richard 
Cheney, drafted the Defense Management Review to the President. The DMR, as it became 
known, addressed the Packard Commission recommendations and other legislative branch 
management recommendations. A progress report on the DMR, which appeared in the 
March/April issue of "Defense 90," identified the following six broad goals: 
• Reduce overhead costs while maintaining military strength 
• Enhance weapon systems program performance 
• Reinvigorate the planning and budgeting process 
• Reduce micro-management 
• Strengthen the defense industrial base 
• Improve observation of ethical standards in government and industry 
[Ref. 7:p. 1] 
Additionally the article stated that: 
the DoD has identified initiatives to save about $2.3 billion in fiscal year 1991. 
Over a five-year period, fiscal years 1991-1995, the cumulative savings will be close 
to $39 billion.... [Ref. 7: p. 9) 
9 
Donald Atwood, Deputy Secretary of Defense appointed by President Bush in the early 
years of his administration, was tasked with implementing initiatives to meet the DMR's 
goals. Deputy Secretary Atwood was keenly aware of the types of problems facing the 
DoD. He had come to government service from General Motors (GM), and was quite 
familiar with the problem of managing technology. Long before CIM became a buzzword 
in the DoD, it was used extensively at GM. In the mid-1980s, GM was faced with a 
decreasing market share and increasing competition. 
In an attempt to streamline its manufacturing process and increase its efficiency, GM 
acquired Electronic Data Systems (EDS) at a cost of $2.55 billion [Ref. 9: p.164]. At 
the time, this was one of the largest acquisitions in United States history, from the 
beginning, the GM/EDS merger was troublesome. In addition to dealing with the clash of 
two totally different corporate cultures, brought on by the transfer of all GM 
information systems personnel to EDS, EDS was handed the job of streamlining GM's 
computer services operations. By the late 1980s GM was still losing ground. The 
acquisition of EDS, a move that was supposed to solve their technology problems, only 
made matters worse. 
Donald Atwood, then Vice-President of Operations at GM, was intimately involved in 
the GM/EDS deal. While battles raged over employee compensation and fixed price 
contracts, Atwood was one of the few that recognized the unnecessary bureaucracy and 
redundancy in GM's information systems operations. Furthermore, he fought, together 
with EDS, to manage the services more efficiently. He found that the problems existed in 
management and not in technology; or more precisely, in the management of technology. 
To combat these problems, GM devised the CIM approach. To put it simply, GM started 
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over and totally redesigned their business practices. One result is the Saturn plant in 
Spring Hill, Tennessee, which has been identified as a model of efficiency in automobile 
manufacturing. 
In 1989, Deputy Defense Secretary Atwood conceived the Defense Management 
Review Decisions (DMRDs) as the vehicle to simplify the support infrastructure of the 
DoD [Ref. 10: p. 1 ]. The central theme of the DMRDs was to achieve the desired cost 
reductions by cutting overhead rather than fighting capabilities. Specifically, the goal of 
the DMRDs was to save $71 billion between 1990 and 1997 through consolidation, 
increased efficiency, and business process improvement [Ref. 10:p. 2]. It was initially 
intended that $36 billion of these savings would come from changing long-standing 
polices and practices; this left $35 billion to be achieved by CIM [Ref. 11 :p. 281]. 
The Corporate Information Management (CIM) initiative was formally established by 
Deputy Defense Secretary Atwood on October 4, 1989, through three actions. First, an 
executive level group was formed to examine strategies for information resource 
management throughout the DoD. Second, the Deputy Secretary instructed the DoD 
Information Resource Management Office to develop a process guide and management plan 
for management information systems in the DoD. Finally, eight technical and functional 
groups were directed to develop information requirements for the DoD. 
C. EARLY CIM EFFORTS 
The CIM initiative was established under the direction of the DoD Comptroller's 
Office. Initially, it had the following three broad objectives: 
• To ensure the standardization, quality, and consistency of data from DoD's 
multiple management information systems. 
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• To identify and implement management efficiencies in support of business 
areas throughout the information system life-cycle. 
• To eliminate duplication of efforts in the development of multiple information 
systems to meet a single functional requirement. 
[Ref. 12:p. 2] 
These initial efforts were almost certain to fail, for two principal reasons. First, 
the job was put in the hands of financial managers whose primary goal was meeting 
budget deadlines rather than making changes. Second, processes needed to be redesigned, 
not just automated or accelerated. 
D. THE EXECUTIVE LEVEL GROUP 
The Executive Level Group (ELG), formed by Secretary Atwood, reported directly to 
him. Its members are listed in Table 2-1. For the most part, members of the ELG 
TABLE 2-1 THE EXECUTIVE LEVEL GROUP 
NAME POSIIION 
David Hill (Chairman) CIO, General Motors 
Duane Andrews Assistant Secretary of Defense (C31) 
David Chu Assistant Secretary of Defense (PA & E) 
Gary Garret Partner, Anderson Consulting 
Jack Hancock Vice President, Pacific Bell 
George Lundy Dean of Faculties, Loyola University 
David Norton President, Nolan, Norton, Inc. 
Sean O'Keefe Comptroller of the Department of Defense 
Paul Strassmann Vice President, Xerox (retired) 
[Ref. 13] 
came from outside the DoD and brought with them a broad perspective, unhindered by the 
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Pentagon's bureaucracy and compartmentalization. For over six months, members of 
the ELG examined the DoD's $9.2 billion information resource management budget. The 
group found that the DoD, the world's largest information processing organization, was 
overwhelmingly lacking in leadership, control, and strategic planning. 
The ELG observed that when the DoD attempted to apply new information 
technologies, the estimated savings did not result. As with the GM/EDS merger, the 
problem was a failure to improve the overall process before applying the technology. 
The management philosophy that the ELG recommended stressed process improvements 
prior to the enhancement of existing technology or the application of new technology. 
When they had finished, the ELG gave Secretary Atwood a set of 14 principles and a 
model of priorities, both of which exist today in the CIM Strategic Plan. The principles 
are as follows: 
1 . Information will be managed through centralized control with decentralized 
implementation. 
2. Simplification by elimination and consolidation is to be preferred to automation, 
whether developing new, or enhancing, existing information systems. 
3. Proposed and existing business methods will be subject routinely to cost- benefit 
analyses, which include benchmarking against the best public and private sector 
achievement. 
4. New business methods shall be proven or validated before implementation. 
5. Information systems performing the same function must be common unless 
specific analysis determines they should be unique. 
6. Functional management shall be held accountable for all benefits and all directly 
controllable costs of developing and operating their information system. 
7. Information systems shall be developed and enhanced according to a department-
wide methodology and accomplished in a compressed time frame in order to 
minimize the cost of development and achieve eariy realization of benefits. 
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8. Information systems shall be developed and enhanced in the context of process 
models that document business methods. 
9. The computing and communication infrastructures shall be transparent to the 
information system that relies upon them. 
10. Common definitions and standards for data shall exist department-wide. 
11. Wherever practical, information services shall be acquired through 
competitive bidding, considering internal and external sources. 
12. Data must be entered only once. 
13. Access to information shall be facilitated, controlled, and limited as required. 
Information also must be safeguarded against unintentional or unauthorized 
alteration, destruction or disclosure. 
14. The presentation to the user shall be friendly and consistent. 
[Ref. 11 :pp. 286-288] 
The CIM model (Figure 2-1 ), first drawn by David Hill, defined CIM priorities in 
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Figure 2-1 The CIM Model [Ref 11 :p. 288] 
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the following order: a) policy ahead of everything else; b) business methods and 
performance measurement ahead of modeling; and c) information systems and technology 
decisions take place only after all the conditions for their success are in place. 
[Ref. 11: p. 288] 
E. FUNCTIONAL WORK GROUPS 
In addition to the ELG, the following eight functional work groups were formed: 
1 . Civilian Payroll 
2. Civilian Personnel 
3. Contract Payment 
4. Financial Operations 
5. Government Furnished Materials 
6. Material Management 
7. Medical 
8. Warehousing (Distribution Center) 
[Ref. 12:p. 2] 
The functional groups consist of senior-level defense officials, charged with the task of 
examining business practices, identifying management efficiencies, developing standard 
requirements and data formats, and determining how best to implement standard systems 
within common functional areas. It was intended that each functional group would use 
consistent development processes and methodologies. These processes and methodologies 
were to produce standard functional requirements and specifications for single 
management information systems within each functional area [Ref. 12:p. 2]. 
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F. CIM REORGANIZATION 
In December of 1990, the Secretary of Defense moved control of CIM from the 
Comptroller's office to ASD(C31) [Ref. 14:p.1]. Additionally, ASD(C31)'s 
responsibilities were increased to cover the Defense Communication Agency (now DISA), 
the Defense Mapping Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the General Defense 
Intelligence Program [Ref 14:p.1 ]. The organization chart is shown in Figure 2-2. 
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Figure 2-2 CIM Organization [Ref. 15:p. 6] 
Information (DDI). The DDI was given defense-wide information technology 
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responsibilities for the development and implementation of standard information 
systems [Ref. 15:p. 7]. In conjunction with this reorganization, a plan was developed 
for the implementation of CIM that was more closely aligned with the original 
recommendations of the ELG. Its was intended to be a top-down effort to simplify and 
improve functional processes by: (1) documenting business goals, methods, and 
performance measures, 
(2) identifying and developing improved business processes and data requirements, and 
(3) evaluating and applying information technology to support these business process 
improvements. In 1992, the DDI issued guidance on how the DoD should manage and 
implement business improvements along functional lines. This guidance was a major 
shift for the services that have historically managed their own business functions. 
Moreover, 1992 was also the year when DISA became the central manager of the DoD's 
information systems infrastructure. The DoD infrastructure includes all DoD 
communication support networks requiring systems integration which were managed 
under the CIM initiative. As the central manager, DISA responsibilities included: 
1 . implementation of information system security 
2. development, specifications, certification, and enforcement of information 
technology standards 
3. network management, engineering, design, and control of long haul and 
regional communications 
4. management and work load control of data processing instruments 
5. central design activities for support systems activities 
6. acquisition of information technology components and services that require 
integration. [Ref. 16:p. 12] 
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An additional change for the Services came under the Defense Information 
Management Program (DoD directive 8000.1), which formally established 
policy for CIM implementation, and created the position of Principle Staff 
Assistants (PSAs), senior functional officials responsible for implementing 
improvements within the DoD's business functions across traditional service and 
agency boundaries. The PSAs, which continue to figure prominently in the new 
Strategic Plan, are responsible for evaluating their respective business areas, 
reengineering them as required, and identifying systems and technology needed 
for support. 
Just when it seemed the CIM initiative was making progress, administrations 
changed. While the current administration stated their support for the CIM 
initiative, it lost the momentum it had gained prior to the election. The role of 
the DOl, which had been pivotal in pushing CIM implementation, was vacant for 
months and finally returned from DISA to the ASD(C31) office as it had been 
previous to the reorganization. Furthermore, while the current ASD(C31), 
Emmett Paige, has professed his support for CIM, there was an initial 
misunderstanding during his confirmation hearings that may have contributed to 
slowing the CIM initiative's momentum [Ref. 17]. It wasn't until the recently 
released Strategic Plan, the formation of the DoD Enterprise Integration 
Executive Board and the DoD Enterprise Integration Corporate Management 
Council, that the current administration demonstrated their support. 
The DoD Enterprise lntegration(EI) Executive Board and the DoD Enterprise 
Integration Corporate Management Council were officially established in April of 
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1994, in a memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, John Deutch. 
The El Executive Board was established to " ... exchange information about cross-
functional management concepts and plans, and as a forum for the exchange of a 
full range of views about DoD policies to achieve the goals of CIM and an 
enterprise integration approach .... " [Ref. 18] The board is the replacement for 
the Information Policy Board, which had functioned as an advisory council to the 
DOl. It is scheduled to meet twice a year with ad hoc sessions as required. Its 
membership is listed below: 
• Deputy Secretary of Defense (Chairman) 
• PDUSD-Acquisition and Technology (Executive Secretary of the Army) 
• Secretary of the Navy 
• Secretary of the Air Force 
• Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 
• USD-Acquisition and Technology 
• USD-Policy 
• USD- Personnel and Readiness 
• Comptroller of the DoD 
• ASD(C3I) 
• General Counsel of the DoD (Legal Advisor) 
[Ref. 18] 
The same memorandum established the El Corporate Management Council, with a 
similar purpose. The members of the council include: 
• ASDC31 (Co-Chairman) 
• PDUSD-Acquisition and Technology (Co-Chairman) 
• USD-Personnel and Readiness 
• Comptroller of the DoD 
• ASD-Health Affairs 
• ASD-Reserve Affairs 
• Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation 
• DUSD-Policy 
• DUSD-Acquisition Reform 
• DUSD-Environmental Security 
• DUSD-Logistics 
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• Director, J-6 
• Members of the military departments as nominated by their service secretaries 
[Ref. 18] 
The Council is scheduled to meet four to six times per year. Issues that cannot be 
resolved at the council level will be forwarded to the El Executive Board. 
G. CIM FOR THE 21st CENTURY 
The recently released "CIM Strategic Plan for the 21st Century" fills a gap that has 
existed in the CIM initiative since the ELG. While much work has been accomplished, 
CIM has lacked the strategic guidance that this plan is meant to provide. In addition, 
because the two are so closely related, the Strategic Plan has been distributed in 
conjunction with "Enterprise Integration Implementing Strategy." The two documents, 
together represent a combined effort on the parts of ASD(C3l) and DISA, with ASD(C3l) 
responsible for the CIM plan and DISA accountable for the integration strategy. The two 
documents were endorsed in an introductory from the Deputy Secretary of Defense that 
instructed the documents be used as management guidance for the El Executive Board and 
the El Corporate Management Council. Additionally, the Deputy Secretary of Defense 
tasked the ASD(C31) to work with the members of the El Corporate Management Council 
to: 
• Update and integrate the initial version of this plan by the fall of 1994. 
• Expand the CIM planning to include functional plans of the Principle Staff 
Assistants and Component plans. 
• Focus the planning and implementing strategy to identify issues appropriate for 
consideration of the El Executive Board and El Corporate Management Council 
[Ref. 19] 
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The CIM Strategic Plan stated the following six goals: 
1. "Reinvent" and reengineer DoD functional processes to achieve greater mission 
effectiveness at lower cost. 
2. Tie DoD together through the use of common shared data. 
3. Minimize duplication and enhance DoD's information systems to embody 
reengineered processes. 
4. Implement a flexible, world-wide computer and communications infrastructure. 
5. Apply corporate information management to integrate defense enterprise-wide 
operations. 
6. Establish CIM polices and management structure. 
[Ref. 20:p. 7] 
These six broad goals are intended to address functional process reengineering, 
standardization, functional and technical integration, and management of the CIM 
initiative at all levels of the DoD. Lead and support roles, objectives, actions required, 
and performance measures are outlined for each goal. There is also an "over-arching" 
CIM goal which states that CIM will "Enable the commanders of military forces and the 
managers of support activities to achieve the highest effectiveness, agility, and 
efficiency in their operations through the effective use of information applied in 
improved functional processes."[Ref. 20:p. 6] 
The management structure necessary for these far reaching goals is supported by 
four pillars: 
• business process improvement 
• data 
• information systems 
• computer and communications infrastructure 
[Ref. 20:p. 6] 
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The El Implementing Strategy is the key for integrating these four foundations. It 
provides the link between the functional and technical aspects at all levels in the DoD, 




After gathering steam for many years, "reengineering" burst upon corporate America in 
1990. It has been tanted by some as a management panacea ever since, and has become 
firmly entrenched in corporate management ideology. Yet many organizations that have 
attempted to reengineer have not been successful. As Hammer and Champy attest, as many as 
50 to 70 percent of organizations that attempt reengineering fail to achieve the dramatic 
results they intend [Ref. 21 :p. 200]. Nevertheless, reengineering success stories in the 
private sector do exist and cannot be overlooked by the public sector. 
This paper was written with the premise that reengineering should be, and is, taking 
place in the public sector, most notably in the DoD through the CIM initiative. This chapter 
will examine what reengineering is, and how information technology is influencing business 
process redesign. It will provide two brief examples of reengineering success in the private 
sector. In addition, the reengineering effort currently underway in the DoD will be 
examined through a number of reports and personal interviews focused on the CIM initiative 
and business process redesign. 
8. DEFINITION 
The foundations of today's organizations were established over two hundred years ago 
under the assumption that work should be broken down into tasks. These tasks could, for the 
most part, be completed sequentially. In today's post-computer revolution, successful 
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organizations are designed to unify these tasks into business processes [Ref. 21 :p. 2]. True 
reengineering is a radical redesign of business processes to achieve major gains in cost, 
service, and/or time. Many of today's popular buzzwords-such as "rightsizing," 
"reinventing" and "downsizing"-fail to accurately describe what reengineering truly 
means. Therefore, it is important to better understand what reengineering means and what 
it involves. 
One of the most widely accepted definitions of reengineering is providing Michael 
Hammer and James Champy's book, Reengineering the Corporation: A Manifesto for Business 
Revolution. It states, "Reengineering is the fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of 
business processes to achieve dramatic improvements in critical, contemporary measures 
of performance, such as cost, quality, service and speed." [Ref. 2:p. 32] Given this 
definition, it is no surprise that reengineering appears foreign to the inertia-bound DoD. 
Yet, it serves as an appropriate start to the DoD reengineering effort because of the dramatic 
change it demands from the traditional DoD organizational paradigm. 
In addition, Hammer and Champy list four themes that emerge from analyzing 
reengineering case studies: 
• Rule-Breaking 
• Process orientation 
• Ambition 
• Creative use of information technology 
A key foundation for successful reengineering is breaking away from the traditional 
assumptions of how the organization functions. In order for an organization to succeed at 
reengineering it must abandon old assumptions, such as specialization and sequential 
design; Hammer and Champy refer to this as rule-breaking. Process orientation allows 
an organization to cut across traditional organizational boundaries. As the examples 
later in this chapter will show, the entire process must be reengineered, not only a 
specific department's tasks. In the third category, ambition, Hammer and Champy are 
alluding to the "dramatic improvements" and "radical" changes cited in their definition 
of reengineering. If an organization seeks only moderate gains in efficiency (e.g., 
through automation), it does not have the ambition to make the giant leap of total process 
redesign. Last, it is only through the creative use of technology that effective 
reengineering is possible. Modern technology enables the organization to alter its 
processes in radically different ways. [Ref. 2:p. 47] 
In his landmark article, "Reengineering Work: Don't Automate, Obliterate," that 
appeared in Harvard Business Review, Michael Hammer presents the following seven 
principles of reengineering: 
1 . Organize around outcomes, not tasks. 
2. Have those that use the output perform the process. 
3. Subsume information-processing work into the real work that produces the 
information. 
4. Treat geographically dispersed resources as though they were centralized. 
5. Link parallel activities instead of integrating their results. 
6. Put the decision point where the work is performed. 
7. Capture information once at its source. 
[Ref. 22:p. 108-112] 
As Hammer points out in his article, "reengineering need not be haphazard." 
[Ref. 22:p.1 08] While all seven principles may not pertain to every organization, 
many organizations are already applying a number of these principles in their 
reengineering efforts. 
Hammer and Champy are not the only experts on reengineering. Thomas Davenport, 
a partner at Ernst and Young's Center for Information Technology and Strategy, is also a 
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proponent of reengineering. In an article with James Short, Davenport supports a five-
step approach to redesigning business processes; see Figure 3-1 [Ref. 23:p.14]. 
In the first step, Develop Business Vision and Process Objectives, the 
organization should set its targets and prioritized objectives. As with Hammer and 
Champy, Davenport and Short recommend that because it is difficult to gage how much 
improvement is possible, "reach should exceed grasp" with respect to targets. 
Davenport and Short also recommend prioritizing objectives, such as cost reduction, 
time reduction, improving output quality, etc., at this stage [Ref. 23:p.14]. 
Develop Business Vision and Process Objectives 
Identify Processes to be Redesigned 
Understand and Measure Existing Processes 
Identify Information Technology Levers 
Design and Build a Prototype of the Process 
Figure 3-1 Five Steps in Process Redesign [Ref. 23:p. 14] 
The second step in process redesign, Identify Processes to be Redesigned, contains a 
notable difference from Hammer and Champy's "all or nothing" approach. As Davenport 
and Short point out: 
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Even when total redesign was the ultimate objective, the companies we studied 
selected a few key processes for initial efforts. Moreover, when there was 
insufficient commitment to total redesign, a few successful examples of IT-
enhanced processes became a powerful selling tool. 
[Ref. 23: p.15) 
Davenport and Short specify two approaches in the identification of processes to be 
redesigned: exhaustive and high-impact. Using the exhaustive approach, all processes 
within the organization that will be redesigned are identified and prioritized. 
Alternatively, the high-impact approach redesigns only the most important processes, 
given the business vision and process objectives developed in step one of Figure 3-1. 
According to Davenport and Short, organizations undertaking the high-impact approach 
have been generally more successful than those that have employed the exhaustive 
approach. Their general rule is that most organizations can only manage the redesign of 
ten to fifteen processes per year. [Ref. 23:p. 15] 
The third step in process redesign is to Understand and Measure Existing Processes 
before redesigning them. Clearly understanding the process may in itself identify 
problems that can be avoided in the redesign. An accurate measurement of the process 
prior to redesign provides a benchmark for later assessments. 
Davenport and Short's fourth step is to Identify Information Technology Levers. 
Their central theme is the involvement of information technology from the outset of 
redesign, rather than simply designing a system to fulfill the requirements of a process. 
The use of information technology will be discussed in greater detail later in this 
chapter. 
The last step in process redesign is to Design and Build a Prototype of the Process. 
However, Davenport and Short note that this is not the end of the redesign. While they 
recommend that the same team that performed the previous four steps design and build 
the prototype, they recognize that it is an iterative procedure that will be continually 
examined and improved. 
In his book, Process Innovation: Reengineering Work Through Information 
Technology, Davenport offers to the following six points for managers: 
1 . Process innovation is a new and desirable approach to transforming 
organizations and improving their performance. 
2. An explicit approach to process innovation is important. 
3. Information and information technology are powerful tools for enabling and 
implementing process innovation. 
4. How a firm approaches organization and human resources is critical to the 
enablement and implementation of innovative process. 
5. Process innovation must occur within a strategic context and be guided by a 
vision of the future process state. 
6. Innovation initiatives can benefit all manner of processes. 
[Ref. 24:p. 299] 
To understand the differences between Davenport and Hammer, each of these points 
should be addressed individually. Davenport's first conclusion clearly differentiates 
between process innovation and process improvement. However, unlike Hammer and 
Champy, Davenport comes to the realistic conclusion that reengineering may be a 
combination of both innovation and improvement. Furthermore, it is for the 
organization to determine which to pursue for any given situation. As addressed earlier, 
both Davenport and Hammer express the need to follow a specific approach when 
reengineering. Process innovation can not just happen casually; it must be structured to 
include several if not all of the key elements of the approaches described by both 
Davenport and Hammer. Yet, while Hammer mentions the enabling role of information 
technology, it is Davenport who addresses information technology as both an enabler and 
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implementer. Specifically, Davenport identifies CASE tools, which allow design 
activities to implement process innovation concurrently across traditional 
organizational boundaries. [Ref. 24:p. 212] 
Davenport compares the roles organization and human resources play in process 
innovation to that of information technology. They both enable and implement the change 
process through empowering workers, establishing work teams, and creating new 
process-oriented organizational structures. [Ref. 24:p. 301] 
Yet Davenport warns of the problems that organization and human resources may 
cause. He states: 
Process innovation must somehow be associated with a broad program of 
cultural change, whether it engenders it or results from it. An early initiative 
can run counter to an organization's culture, but for it and subsequent initiatives 
to be successful, the culture must adapt. 
[Ref. 24:p. 304] 
Accepting that organizational cultures are developed over time, it is evident that adapting 
the organization's culture may be one of the greatest obstacles to reengineering. 
Adapting to change is the focus of Chapter V of this paper. 
According to Davenport's fifth conclusion, strategy and vision must precede the 
design and analysis for process innovation to be a successful undertaking. The processes 
that will be redesigned should be identified and measured with specific targets to direct 
efforts. Successfully demonstrating dramatic improvements in cost, service or time 
will enhance support for reengineering. Without vision and strategy, process 
innovation risks achieving only incremental improvement that, while desirable, fails to 
attain the dramatic improvement that is sought. 
Davenport's last conclusion, the focus of three chapters of his book, deals with 
specific types of processes, ranging from product development to order management. 
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While most his examples are from the private sector, none of the processes is unique. 
Davenport also adheres to the belief that while it may be more difficult in the public 
sector, " ... there is no reason to believe that process innovation efforts ... in the public 
sector are any less likely to succeed." [Ref. 24:p. 303] 
In summary, while both are strong advocates of reengineering, Davenport provides a 
method for organizations to "test the waters." Hammer, in contrast, would have 
organizations jump in from the start. Given the size and complexity of an organization 
such as the DoD, Davenport's approach may prove more prudent. It also provides the 
time necessary to disseminate a Strategic Plan and foster support through successful 
examples. 
C. THE ROLE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
The information technology explosion is transforming the ability to collect, evaluate, 
disseminate, and apply information on a global scale. Both of the methods described 
above by Davenport and Hammer rely in large part on information technology to assist in 
business process redesign. Admittedly, many of the changes taking place within 
organizations today are due to the introduction of new and sometimes untested 
information technology. However, while it is important to stress the proper use of it as 
a critical link in business process redesign, information technology alone is not the 
answer. Many early attempts at applying information technology failed because they 
focused on using the technology to automate or improve existing processes. 
Richard Foster, a management consultant with McKinsey and Company, refers to this 
as the "sailing ship phenomenon." [Ref. 25:p. 28] When steamships first made their 
appearance, builders of sailing ships realized they had a problem, so they set out to build 
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faster, sleeker, more efficient sailing ships. Initially, the builders were able to 
improve upon old designs and make faster sailing ships, but eventually the steamships 
proved far more reliable than the best sailing ships. The builders of the sailing ships 
were unable to break from their traditional paradigm. Thus, they were unable to apply 
the available technology limiting the potential success of their solution. Hammer and 
Champy also subscribe to the "sailing ship phenomenon": 
The fundamental error that most companies commit when they look at 
technology is to view it through the lens of their existing process. They ask, 
"How can we use these new capabilities to enhance or streamline or improve 
what we are already doing?" Instead, they should be asking, "How can we use 
technology to allow us to do things we are not already doing?" Reengineering, 
unlike automation, is about innovation. It is about exploiting the latest 
capabilities of technology to achieve entirely new goals. One of the hardest parts 
of reengineering lies in recognizing the new, unfamiliar capabilities of 
technology instead of its familiar ones. 
[Ref. 21:p. 85] 
While Hammer and Champy support the use of information technology, Davenport and 
Short more clearly depict its interdependency with business process redesign. This 
interdependency is shown graphically in Figure 3-2. In Table 3-1, Davenport and 
Short identify nine information technology capabilities and their organizational benefits. 
While this list is not meant to be exhaustive, it does provide the generic capabilities of 
information technology in improving business process redesign. However, Davenport 
also warns of the constraints information technology may place on some organizations' 
infrastructures that cannot or will not be changed. He acknowledges that it is important 
to determine these constraints and how they will limit an organization's freedom in 
designing new processes. [Ref. 24:p. 301] 
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How can information technology Support business processes? 
Information Technology Capabilities Business Process Redesign 
How can business processes be transformed using information technology? 
Figure 3-2 Relationship Between Information Technology and Business Process Redesign 
[Ref. 23:p.12) 
TABLE 3-1 BENEFITS OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY [Ref. 23:p. 17) 
Capability Organizational Impact/Benefit 
Transactional IT can transform unstructured process into routine transactions 
Geographical IT can transfer information with rapidity and ease across large 
distances, making processes independent of geography 
Automational IT can reduce or replace human labor in a process 
Analytical IT can bring complex analytical methods to bear on a process 
Informational IT can bring vast amounts of detailed information into a process 
Sequential IT can enable changes in the sequence of tasks in a process, often 
allowing multiple tasks to be worked on simultaneously 
Knowledge IT allows the capture and dissemination of knowledge and 
Management expertise to improve the process 
Tracking IT allows the detailed tracking of tasks, inputs, and outputs 
Disintermediation IT can be used to connect two parties within a process that would 
otherwise communicate through an intermediary 
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D. FORD MOTOR COMPANY 
The total redesign of the Ford Motor Company's accounts payable process 
provides an example of reengineering in practice. When Ford analysts first began to 
examine the accounts payable process, their goal was to process invoices more quickly 
and with fewer employees. At the time, Ford's accounts payable employed more than 
500 people. Figure 3-3 provides a graphic view of the accounts payable process prior 
to reengineering. Initially, Ford expected that new computer systems and better 
management practices could reduce their personnel in accounts payable by 20 percent 
[Ref. 22:p. 1 05]. However, when Ford compared their accounts payable to Mazda's, 
~ purchasing EJ 
copy of purchase 
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Figure 3-3 Accounts Payable Prior to Reengineering [Ref. 26:p. 88] 
they discovered the astounding fact that Mazda required only five people to process their 
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accounts payable. It was obvious to Ford managers that much more than a 20 percent 
personnel reduction would be necessary to remain competitive. 
Before the reengineering effort began, Ford executives realized that they would 
have to define the processes that accounts payable actually performed. As Hammer 
points out, this step was critical to the effort's success. He believes, "Reengineering 
must focus on redesigning a fundamental business process, not on redesigning 
departments or other organizational units." [Ref. 21 :p. 40] 
It soon became apparent that the old accounts payable process at Ford was 
outdated and inefficient. For example, when the purchasing department wrote a purchase 
order, the original document went to the vendor and a copy to the accounts payable 
department. Subsequently, the vendor would send an invoice to the accounts payable 
department, and the items ordered to the receiving department. The receiving 
department, after verifying the material was delivered, would send the accounts payable 
department a receiving document. The accounts payable department was responsible for 
matching the purchase order against the invoice and receiving document to ensure that 
they agreed, whereupon they would issue payment to the vendor. Under this archaic 
process, the accounting department had to match 14 data items between the receipt 
record, the purchase order, and the invoice before it could make a payment to the vendor. 
Unfortunately, much of the accounts payable department's time was spent reconciling 
differences between documents. [Ref. 22:p. 105] 
The new accounts payable process, shown in Figure 3-4, is dramatically 
different from the old process. Presently, when the purchasing department issues a 
purchase order to a vendor, the order is also entered into an on-line database. The 
vendor then sends the materials to receiving as before, but now receiving has the ability 
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to verify the shipment directly. Moreover, a receiving clerk can check a computer 
terminal to see if the materials received match an outstanding purchase order. If a 
match is found, the clerk at the dock accepts the goods and enters the acceptance into the 
database that automatically issues a payment to the vendor. However, if the material 
does not match an outstanding purchase order, it is returned to the vendor. This new 
method requires only three items to match between the purchase order and the receipt 








Figure 3-4 Ford's Accounts Payable Process after Reegineering [Ref. 26:p. 88] 
The results at Ford meet both the "radical" redesign and "dramatic 
improvements" requirement of Hammer and Champy's definition of reengineering. 
Now, instead of five hundred people there are only 125 responsible for vendor payments 
[Ref. 21 :p. 42]. Initially, when Ford began their reengineering effort, they expected to 
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be able to speed up the accounts payable process. But they discovered that they could do 
away with invoices altogether, not only making the process quicker, but doing away with 
the needless paper trail. Instead of paying suppliers when an invoice is received, Ford 
now relies on the "invoiceless payment" system described above. 
E. BOEING COMMERCIAL DIVISION 
A second example of reengineering can be found at Boeing's Commercial Division, 
with the design and assembly of their newest aircraft, the 777. In the production of the 
first 777, which recently made its maiden flight, Boeing broke with their traditional 
rules, which had left a legacy of compartmentalization and typical corporate practices. 
The design and assembly of the 777 relies on two important innovations. First, 
it is the only commercial airliner to have been completely designed electronically, using 
3-D computer systems. Second, the manufacturing and engineering departments formed 
a single product team for the 777, rather than adhere to the tradition of bringing 
together inputs from different departments. [Ref. 27:p. 143] 
To understand the magnitude of the changes that took place with the 777, a brief 
description of traditional aircraft design is necessary. Before the 777, structural 
specialists would first design the shell of the airplane, and a full-scale wooden mock-up 
would be built. When the mock-up was complete, everyone from hydraulics to electrical 
systems specialist would enter into the design cycle. Each of the specialist groups would 
then negotiate with the structure specialist, competing for the space and weight required 
by their design changes. This process, simplified in Figure 3-5, was sequential in 
nature: after one group of specialists had completed its work, the next group could come 
in and make its changes. 
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Boeing's new process threw out the old notion of working sequentially. The 
specialists worked from the beginning of the project in collocated teams, allowing the 
processes in the design of the aircraft to run concurrently instead of sequentially. 
Additionally, the teams, which became know as DBT's (Design Build Teams), worked 
without a full-scale model. This new method, also shown in Figure 3-5, allowed the 








sequential design method 
step 1 
step 2 
step 1: work together until 
the job is done right 
step 2: no need for rework 
concurrent design method 
Figure 3-5 Simplified Reengineering at Boeing [Ref. 27:p 144] 
The Boeing example, where innovation was limited to the design of a single 
aircraft through the use of new information technology, is an example of the Davenport 
and Short approach to reengineering. Unlike the everything-at-once Hammer and 
Champy approach, Boeing focused its attention on the enablement of new technology to 
accomplish a task never before attempted, the building of an aircraft entirely through 
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----- ________________________________ _j 
electronic imaging and testing without a mock-up. Boeing didnot attempt to use the 
technology to design automobiles, ships, or all their aircraft. They applied the 
technology to design, a specific aircraft -- the 777. 
F. REENGINEERING THE DoD 
Any large organization that expects to be effective in the 1990s and beyond must 
optimize its internal management and business processes. The DoD is no exception. 
Reengineering the DoD is not only possible, but at this point may be unavoidable. When 
it is approached correctly, CIM can provide the foundation to successfully reengineer the 
DoD. Recently, there have been a number of studies, internal and external, examining 
CIM in the context of reengineering and its implementation within DoD. The remainder of 
this chapter examines the CIM reengineering effort from four of the most recent studies, 
and from personal interviews with members of DISA and ASD(C31). 
The Information Technology Association of America (ITAA), using notable experts 
from both industry and the DoD, undertook a study to determine: (1) how the DoD can 
achieve enterprise integration, (2) how to gain the commitment of the DoD's senior 
leadership to make a change of this magnitude, and (3) what can be done to address the 
human consequences of downsizing and reengineering. The ITAA report determined that 
the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD), specifically the Deputy Secretary of Defense, 
should be responsible for the overall reengineering effort. The report also recommended 
that a strategic enterprise integration implementation plan be designed, disseminated, 
and implemented immediately. [Ref. 28:p. 20] 
Similarly, the DoD Inspector General completed a report on the status of CIM's 
implementation plan and the effort by the DoD to institutionalize the CIM initiative. The 
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report found that CIM institutionalization within the DoD has been severely hindered by 
the lack of a strategic plan. Furthermore, it found that savings from, and budgeting for, 
the CIM initiative are improperly tracked and analyzed. The report concluded that the 
Director of Defense Information (DOl) needs to develop formal policy and 
implementation guidance for the CIM initiative. [Ref. 28:p. 21] 
One of the most extensive studies is the Defense Information Management Follow-
On Action Study, completed by Booz, Allen and Hamilton, Inc., at the request of ASD(C3I). 
Concerning business process redesign, this study found the following: 
While the Department has successfully implemented business process 
reengineering (BPR) and functional process improvement (FPI) to reduce costs 
and improve effectiveness, the organization has yet to address the larger scale 
issues that still exist. To date, DoD has initiated more than 200 projects focused 
on process improvement and reengineering. The majority of these efforts have 
been driven from the bottom up, rather than from the top down. These efforts 
have also focused on local functional improvements, rather than the far-reaching 
change that can result in significant improvements throughout the Department. 
The continuing evolution of BPR success within the Department requires a change 
in participation at the executive level. While the Department has demonstrated 
its support for BPR activity, it has yet to back this support up with clear 
examples of the reengineering that should be encouraged. 
[Ref. 29:p. ES17] 
This same study recommended that the DoD overcome the incorrect perception that CIM 
is limited to reducing information technology costs through systems replacement. 
Rather, the savings are expected to come from business process redesign. While the 
report determined that ASD(C31) should have the lead role in business process redesign, 
it recommended that DISA control compliance with all information technology standards 
and polices. The report stated: 
... DISA should exercise centralized authority to ensure compliance with all IT 
standards and policies. Clear, written responsibilities are required to explicitly 
define the Service/Agency and DISA roles in base-level IT support. Additional 
emphasis should be placed on innovative acquisition strategies to accomplish 
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base-level IT modernization. Uniform methodologies should be developed to 
prioritize IT needs at all bases, depending upon mission impact. This 
prioritization can then be used to allocate scarce IT modernization resources 
among the Services so that power projection (overseas) bases receive the 
modernization and upgrades they need. 
[Ref. 29:p. ES19] 
Furthermore, the study found that cost data within the DoD is often absent or inaccurate. 
Thus, many decisions are based on uncertain or incompatible economic information. 
A summary of the report is provided in Figure 3-6. 
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Figure 3-6 Summary of Results of Booz, Allen and Hamilton Study [Ref. 29:p. 6F] 
Another study, by George Mason University's Institute of Public Policy, found the 
DoD must continue to examine successful (and unsuccessful) examples of reengineering 
in the private sector [Ref. 30:p. 17]. The report points out that while business process 
redesign is not unique to the DoD, the DoD faces the additional challenge of downsizing in 
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conjunction with reengineering. While the study admits that downsizing and 
reengineering are not mutually exclusive events, it suggests that it will be difficult for 
both to occur concurrently. Employee involvement in the reengineering effort has been 
identified as a prerequisite for success. Given the threat of termination, it is unlikely 
that DoD employees will be receptive to reengineering. However, in the example of 
reengineering used earlier at the Ford Motor Company, Ford employees that participated 
in the process innovation were promised redeployment. 
Given the downsizing issue at DoD, the George Mason University report found that: 
... several key processes should be selected. Initiate process innovation within 
these processes ... Once successes are obtained, reevaluate and select additional 
processes for innovation initiatives. A DoD-wide reengineering effort does not 
seem practical. Build some successes prior to "shocking" the entire 
organization. 
[Ref. 30:p. 17] 
Since the CIM initiative's inception, there have been numerous reports from the 
GAO, criticizing the DoD implementation of CIM. The most recent GAO report, released in 
April 1994 to specifically address the CIM initiative, was "Defense Management: 
Stronger Support needed for CIM Initiative to Succeed." It made the following 
recommendations: 
• Ensure the development of a management strategy with well defined roles and 
authorities to (1) plan and manage CIM, (2) gain the mutual support of the 
military services and defense agencies, and (3) manage and control funds to 
ensure the effective implementation and integration of improved business 
processes and systems. 
• Seek the views of outside, expert practitioners to provide independent 
perspectives on the CIM initiative. 
• Ensure the development of a cohesive, complete strategic plan, that builds on 
the recommendations of the ELG, to guide CIM implementation and integration. 
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• Ensure an appropriate balance between departmental efforts to reengineer 
and integrate business processes, and to standardize systems. 
• Require that migration systems be supported by sound economic and technical 
analyses before implementation. 
• Require that the costs and benefits of major process and systems 
improvements be assessed prior to making investment decisions, and that 
post-audits be performed to assess benefits and verify cost savings obtained. 
• Direct the PSAs to establish plans consistent with the overall strategic plans 
goals and objectives. 
[Ref. 28:p. 14] 
To obtain a broader perspective on recent advances in the implementation of the CIM 
initiative, a number of personal interviews were conducted with individuals at ASD(C31) 
and at DISA. The interviews supported the conclusions in the above-mentioned reports, 
and produced the following assessments. First, despite the intention for the widest 
dissemination of the CIM initiative, many employees, both civilian and military, do not 
understand CIM's far reaching goals and objectives. Organizations, commands, and units 
"outside the beltway" are often not up to date on the status of CIM. Second, many 
interviewees express doubt about the ability of DISA to undertake such an enormous 
task, given the frequent reorganizations. Finally, some feel that integration, even if 
attainable, may not be as desirable as the status quo. 
The following list summarizes recurring problems with the CIM initiative, based 
on the studies and interviews described above. 
• There is still a need for guidance at all levels of the DoD with regard to strategic 
planning for the CIM initiative. 
• Continuity in the mission of the CIM initiative is questionable due to political 
turbulence. 
• There is no central authority to enforce policy and prioritized CIM-related 
initiatives. 
.4 2 
• Lack of a clear DoD-wide understanding of the CIM initiative is hindering its 
acceptance. 
• There exists a lack of executive level commitment 
• Allegiances to individual services and agencies remains a considerable obstacle. 
• Lack of consistency of economic analysis throughout the DoD is hindering CIM-
related initiatives. 
• DoD-wide process innovation is likely to fail if attempted. 
Each of the above points will be addressed in the following chapters. 
In short, the CIM initiative has demonstrated the inability of the DoD to effectively 
implement fundamental change. Despite recommendations from the ELG and numerous 
subsequent reports, not enough emphasis has been placed on the aspect of organizational 
change demanded by the CIM initiative. 
43 
. 
IV. OBSTACLES TO CIM AND REENGINEERING THE DoD 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The creation of the CIM Strategic Plan and the El Implementation Strategy, as well as 
the formation of the El Corporate Management Council and the El Executive Board, are 
steps in the right direction. But there are still many unresolved issues and a need for 
continuing evaluation. This was recognized in the strategic plan when it was referred to 
as a "living document that will be refined as priorities change and implementation 
evolves." [Ref. 19] Among the unresolved issues are the eight mentioned at the end of 
Chapter Ill. This chapter will elaborate on each of these. 
8. CIM GUIDANCE 
While there is no doubt that those in leadership roles must completely understand 
and support the reengineering effort, the Strategic Plan may to a certain extent alienate 
members of the services and civilian employees who do not see a place for themselves in 
the new organization. As the George Mason University study suggests, without 
commitment from the work force, reengineering will most likely fail [Ref. 30:p.12]. In 
the absence of job security, or the perception of such, there will be little incentive for 
the work force to move from the status quo. While commitment from the top is a 
prerequisite for success, educating the work force and gaining each worker's 
commitment is also necessary. 
If processes are to be redesigned, who is best suited to recommend changes -
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managers who are responsible for the process or those who actually perform the 
process? Of course, the redesign will prove more successful if the individuals most 
familiar with the actual process are encouraged to participate. But within the DoD there 
is currently no method or motivation for these individuals to dramatically alter the 
processes with which they are most familiar. 
Central to this theme of guidance at all levels is the need for the DoD to 
institutionalize CIM. As Paul Strassmann, former Defense Director of Information, 
states, a major area that defines CIM deals with the "effort to make CIM a permanent 
fixture, a permanent program, a permanent change in the way the DoD handles 
information." [Ref. 10:p. 1] Thomas Davenport continues along this line: 
... process innovation must itself be viewed as a process, not a project. If initial 
efforts are successful, companies will move on to redesign other processes, a 
prospect that stretches to decades. 
[Ref. 24:p. 305] 
Unfortunately, the vacuum at the top created by a change in administrations is 
viewed by many as a lack of commitment. Even though events of the past year, such as 
the Secretary of Defense's vocal support for CIM, and the release of the Strategic Plan, 
are significant steps in the institutionalization of CIM, there remains a significant 
amount of doubt as to the survival of the initiative. 
C. CONTINUITY IN MISSION 
Lack of continuity of mission is seen most clearly through two examples in the early 
stages of CIM: the placement of CIM under the DoD Comptroller, and through the change 
in strategy from the initial grand design to the current migration of systems. The move 
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to ASD(C31), while necessary, led to confusion over who was in charge. In retrospect, 
the CIM initiative probably should have originally been placed under ASD(C31). It was 
prevented by resistance from the services to integrating command and control systems. 
The change from initial strategy of a grand design to migration was simply a matter 
of dollars. Functional Economic Analysis (FEA) demonstrated that, in almost every case, 
building a system from scratch was a more expensive choice -- to say nothing of the 
difficulties of convincing people to migrate towards a radically system. Resistance to 
such change may be attributed to the organizational cultures and subcultures that have 
developed through the DoD. The difficulty has been compounded because the selection of 
systems has not been viewed with confidence by DoD members. 
Participation by all members of the DoD is closely related to continuity of mission. 
As Davenport states: 
The long-term nature of process innovation leads to issues of executive 
continuity. Enthusiasm for process innovation must not reside with a single 
executive, however important that one person. For process innovation to succeed 
over the long term, a management group that transcends individual executives 
and organizational structures must be committed to process management, to 
information technology, and to organizational change. Process innovation is most 
likely to succeed in firms that exhibit a consistency of mission or "strategic 
intent" that is shared widely among executives and employees. 
[Ref. 24:p. 306] 
Another problem in the DoD is caused by changes in administrations and frequent 
turnover of political appointees. Even in the most recent change in administrations, 
where there was said to be agreement in support of CIM, the turnover of officials created 
a gap in top leadership. In the private sector, when a change in top management occurs, 
the organization's first order of business is to demonstrate that the change provides 
continuity of leadership in a planned, systematic manner [Ref. 31 :p. 32]. This enables 
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managers to handle short-term crises and to achieve a minimum disruption of long term 
planning. With the periodic changes that occur in the leadership of the DoD, it is 
difficult for the CIM initiative to establish any continuity in mission. This issue needs to 
be addressed, with a commitment that allows CIM implementation to supersede political 
considerations. 
D. POLICY ENFORCEMENT 
While the Strategic Plan does provide CIM strategic goals and define support roles 
for each goal, the plan remains a collaboration of management effort between ASD(C31), 
DISA, the Armed Services, and other agencies. As before, there is not a single individual 
or organization responsible for its implementation. Therefore, while the formation of 
the El Executive Board and the El Corporate Management Council does, in a limited 
fashion, address the need for centralized management of the integration effort, even these 
bodies, given their memberships, are susceptible to deterioration over time due to 
political turbulence. Even with the strategic plan there are currently few compliance 
mechanisms to ensure that policies and standards are followed [Ref. 29:pp. Xl-3,4]. 
Skepticism persists as to DISA's ability to operate effectively as an operations and 
maintenance agency: " ... some Pentagon and service brass felt that the growth of DISA's 
staff, from 5,000 people to about 40,000, might hinder the agency's ability to be an 
efficient, responsive organization." [Ref. 32] 
This is indicative of a larger issue that may be considered unique in government and 
the DoD. Unlike private industry, there is a system of checks and balances within 
government that resist change through inherent delays in time and division of control. 
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As Constance Horner, Director of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management in the Reagan 
Administration, states: 
Congress is another big barrier to reform. In micromanaging ... Congress 
advances its interest in accountability but hampers the ability ... to achieve goals. 
[Ref. 33] 
In effect, Secretary Atwood's DMRD process was an administrative innovation that 
worked around the cumbersome program, planning, and budgeting system for making 
long-term commitments [Ref. 11 :p. 278]. 
The need for reform of the mechanisms that control the development, acquisition, and 
management of DoD information resources is a major barrier to reengineering that must 
be addressed for successfully implementing the CIM initiative. 
E. LACK OF UNDERSTANDING AND DISSEMINATION 
Changes in leadership and policy concerning the CIM initiative have left many 
individuals throughout the DoD unclear about its true objectives. When changes do 
occur, dissemination has been slow and haphazard. The Defense Inspector General's 
report on CIM, mentioned in the previous chapter, found a "lack of an overall CIM plan 
that is clearly presented to, and understood, by DoD managers .... " [Ref. 28:p.6] While 
this problem has been alleviated to some extent by the Strategic Plan, criticism of the 
CIM initiative from inside and outside the DoD continues, based on a misunderstanding of 
the CIM initiative. 
One of the best examples of this lack of understanding and dissemination can be found 
here at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). No environment exists in the Navy better 
suited to deliver the principles of CIM to line managers in the services. NPS, the 
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Navy's premier graduate institute, provides the ideal environment to educate junior 
officers in the principles originally set forth by the ELG. Specifically, within the 
Information Technology Management curriculum, a number of courses could include 
instruction on the efforts to reengineer the DoD. Currently, the concept of 
reengineering is only covered in a limited number of classes. Ideally, instruction could 
be broadened to include all of NPS's students. 
F. EXECUTIVE LEVEL COMMITMENT 
Perhaps the largest gap in the implementation of the CIM initiative, prior to the 
release of the Strategic Plan, was the lack of commitment from senior levels of DoD 
management. Changes in leadership and confusion over strategy have led to widespread 
skepticism regarding commitment to the initiative. Additional criticisms from outside 
the DoD contributed to the ambiguity over the future of the initiative. As recently as last 
year, the CIM initiative seemed likely to fail due to lack of funding and political 
infighting. [Ref. 34] 
Even taking into consideration that the Strategic Plan and the creation of the El 
Corporate Management Council and the El Executive Board have helped to clear up the 
ambiguity, there is still need for more clearly defined roles and responsibilities. 
Specifically, the DoD needs a Chief Information Officer (CIO), a position critical to 
ensuring effective management of information technology within the DoD. In the private 
sector, the function of the CIO is characterized by little or no direct implementation 
responsibility. Instead, the CIO's emphasis is on policy setting, standards, and 
enterprise strategy development [Ref. 29:p. 11-4]. Currently, the ASD(C31) is most 
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analogous to the role of CIO; however, the authority of the CIO should be more in line 
with that held by the Deputy Secretary of Defense [Ref. 29:p. 11-4]. Few would expect 
the Chief Executive Officer of a large private corporation to also wear the hat of CIO; the 
DoD is essentially no different. Thus, authority for information technology decisions on 
policy and standards need to rest in a single office. 
G. SERVICE ALLEGIANCE 
Service allegiances are a barrier to CIM implementation. The Odeen Panel, created 
by Secretary Of Defense Aspin in January of 1994 to review the DMR program, found 
that while a major drive is underway to develop common systems, the services object to 
areas were they feel centralization has gone too far[Ref. 32]. As Roger Beaumont points 
out in Joint Military History, at the core of friction between the services lies a 
difference in their functions. Despite a meshing to some extent of weapons and systems, 
"many practices, values and reflexes have remained separate, well beyond the level 
dictated by a division of labor ... " and that " .. .formal obedience to edict may not be 
matched in essence." [Ref. 5:p. 190] 
Even if CIM is successful in all other aspects, it is the cultures of the services that 
must be altered for true cross-functionality. Additionally, as the study at George Mason 
University determined, "The Services should be educated in change management so they 
will want to enforce policy decisions made at the OSD level." [Ref. 30:p. 1 0] 
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H. CONSISTENT ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
While historically the DoD has not approached cost tracking as operationally 
imperative, there is currently economic pressure for effective cost tracking. From its 
inception, CIM has been criticized for failure to track costs and analyze savings in a 
consistent, accurate, and timely manner. In response, the DoD developed the Functional 
Economic Analysis (FEA) decision package. 
The FEA is guided by three principles. First, it focuses on functional processes, not 
information systems. It is intended to provide a bottom-line understanding needed to use 
various types of resources in order to meet objectives. The second guiding principle is 
measurement. The FEA requires the measurement of key attributes of functional 
processes, such as cost and outputs. These quantitative measures are nnportant in 
assessing the current state of the functional process in setting substantive objectives, in 
evaluating an alternative means to achieve those objectives, and in gauging progress 
towards the objectives. Finally, the FEA is designed to be a continuing management tool, 
not a one-time reporting requirement. It is intended to allow managers to respond more 
quickly, and consistently, to analyses required for the existing acquisitio!T! and 
programming/budgeting processes. 
[Ref. 35 p.124] 
Despite the guidance offered by the FEA decision package, the DoD continues to lack 
sufficient cost tracking. As a recent GAO report found, in the nine functional areas 
examined, none had completed the FEA. It is clear that the effective management of costs 
and analysis of cost savings is another obstacle for CIM to overcome. 
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I. DoD-WIDE PROCESS INNOVATION 
Finally, it is important to address the view that DoD-wide process innovation is 
likely to fail. In fact, while conclusions reached by the reports and interviews above 
may appear to favor abandoning reengineering, they are actually recommending an 
approach to reengineering that is more likely to succeed in the DoD. Specifically, these 
conclusions point to Thomas Davenport's high-impact approach to process innovation, 
discussed earlier. By identifying a few processes to be redesigned and then using these 
processes as examples, the DoD could lend credibility to the reengineering effort. 
Perhaps focusing attention on just one functional area would be more successful than 
attempting DoD-wide reengineering in all functional areas, in all business processes, 
and all at the same time. 
Thus, the first step in Davenport's high-impact approach, identifying processes for 
innovation, is extremely significant to an organization such as the DoD, that is so 
resistent to change. Davenport outlines the following five key activities that enable an 
organization to identify processes for innovation: 
1. Enumerate major processes 
2. Determine process boundaries 
3. Assess strategic relevance of each process 
4. Render high-level judgements of the "health" of each process 
5. Qualify the culture and politics of each process 
[Ref. 24:p. 27) 
Davenport's first step, Enumerate major processes, is most appropriate to the 
DoD, given the department's attempt at reengineering all processes simultaneously. He 
states: 
... experience leads us to set the appropriate number of processes at between 
10 and 20. Within this range-which leaves us some cross-process activity but 
52 
renders each process small enough to be understood-change management is only 
very difficult rather that impossible. 
[Ref. 24:p. 28-30] 
Davenport advises that the processes be defined as broadly as possible if the goal is 
radical redesign. This will enable the organization to realize benefits by improving 
handoffs between functions. 
Davenport's second key activity, Determine process boundaries, is an iterative 
exercise. As innovation takes place in one process, it may give rise to redesign, or at 
least modification, in others. [Ref. 24:p. 31] 
Once the boundaries of the processes have been identified, the organization can begin 
innovation on selected individual processes within the given range. Again, Davenport 
warns that attempting innovation on all processes concurrently is likely to fail due to 
the demand on the organizations resources. Moreover, even if the resources are 
available, most organizations cannot endure the magnitude of organizational change 
required by simultaneous innovation over all processes. In addition, simultaneous 
change in multiple processes can be extremely difficult to coordinate. Even if the 
organization understands the level of change and can endure the unrest that the change 
will cause, it is more advantageous to limit the number of processes undergoing 
innovation due to the coordination required between them. 
Finally, Davenport does lend a word of caution that is especially significant to the 
DoD. When organizations attempt reengineering, he states " ... the best candidates for 
process innovation are those whose short-term survival is not in question, but whose 
long-term viability is unlikely without major change." [Ref. 24:p. 305] The DoD 
certainly fits into this category. 
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V. CHANGE MANAGEMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Managing change effectively within the DoD is critical to the success of the CIM 
initiative. The basic premise of this chapter is that those individuals within the DoD 
who will be expected to implement change are ill prepared to do so. It is intended that 
the principles introduced in this chapter will help those individuals become more 
resilient and better suited to manage the changes ahead. This chapter draws on the work 
of Daryl Conner, founder of Organizational Development Resources (ODR), Inc., a 
management consulting firm in Atlanta, Georgia. This chapter will examine the 
following seven patterns of change that Conner identifies in his book, Managing at the 
Speed of Change: 
1. The nature of change 
2. The process of change 
3. The roles of change 
4. Resistance to change 
5. Commitment to change 
6. Culture and change 
7. Synergy 
[Ref. 36] 
Central to the concept of managing change is the premise that change is no longer an 
occasional event. Tomorrow's organizations will have to deal with change as a constant. 
The DoD is entering an era of unending transition that will likely accelerate far beyond 
anyone's expectations. Managing change in this new era will be critical to the continued 
success of the DoD. 
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B. THE NATURE OF CHANGE 
The nature of change focuses on the disruption that change causes, and how successful 
managers of change adapt to the disruption. As Davenport states, "The wrenching nature 
of organizational change is the most difficult aspect of process innovation .... " 
[Ref. 24:p. 13] Understanding the nature of change, and that change can be perceived 
differently by different individuals, groups or organizations, are key aspects to 
assimilation. Conner defines major change as a loss of control resulting in a significant 
disruption in established expectations [Ref. 36:p. 74]. Many individuals view change as 
a crisis, and cope by trying to maintain control and revert to the status quo, rather than 
attempting to adapt. Moreover, while Conner asserts that every person, group, and 
organization has a finite capacity to assimilate change, he also believes that people and 
organizations can learn to increase their assimilative capacity if they understand and can 
recognize the patterns of change. Knowing your organization's capacity for change and 
understanding when the organization is at its limit of change are necessary to 
successfully manage the pace of change. 
Conner identifies the levels of change as micro, organizational, and macro. Micro 
change, when only the individual must change, affects family, close friends, and 
associates. Organizational change, when the group must change, may affect work, 
church, professional associations, unions, etc. Macro change, when everyone must 
change, may affect a large constituency, such as with the national debt or health care 
reform [Ref. 36:p. 79]. Paradoxically, Conner observes that although the term macro 
implies a large change, it actually has the least effect on an individual's day-to-day 
routine: 
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Until people see a personal connection between their own behavior and the 
resolution of the organizational or macro issue, the problem is simply an 
intellectual exercise and not personally relevant... Much of our problem with 
making organizational or macro changes is that we fail to adequately communicate 
the impact these decisions will have on them personally. 
[Ref. 36:p. 80-81] 
Admittedly, few decisions within the DoD can be made under the consideration of how 
each and every individual will be affected. But successful managers of change will 
understand that, wherever possible, consideration should be given to how change will 
impact individuals, and to how individuals may perceive the impact of change. 
It is important that change managers realize that each level of change has a 
cumulative effect and as such works against an individual's overall capacity to assimilate 
change. Whether the change is micro, organizational, macro or a combination, 
individuals use a portion of their assimilation capacity to deal with the change. On the 
micro level a person may be facing such dramatic change that they are unable to deal 
with even the simplest organizational change. 
In describing the nature of change, Conner offers the following five key principles 
which help increase resilience to change: 
1. Realize that control is what we seek, ambiguity is what we fear. 
2. Attempt to exercise some degree of direct or indirect control over what 
happens during the implementation of change. 
3. Assimilate change at the speed commensurate with the pace of other events 
taking place. 
4. Understand the micro implications of organizational or macro change. 
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5. Face a total assimilation demand from the micro, organizational, and macro 
that is within the individual or organization's absorption limits. 
[Ref. 36:p. 84] 
C. THEPROCESSOFCHANGE 
In describing the process of change, Conner employs a model of change first 
introduced by Kurt Lewin in 1958; see figure 5-1. With this model, 
present 
state 
Figure 5-1 States of Change [Ref. 36:p. 87] 
change is defined using three states: present, transition and desired. Major change is 
only possible when the pain or cost of the status quo, the present state, 
exceeds the cost of that of the transition state. However, he observes that: 
In today's fast-paced world, [existing in] a permanent state is not likely. Most of 
our time will be spent in transitions, not stable states. To understand how we live in 
a constant state of "in between," we must view transitions as periods of "leaving 
from" something, periods of reordering or reconstruction, and periods of "going to" 
something, even if the goals to which we are heading are constantly moving. 
[Ref. 36:p. 87] 
Conner presents two prerequisites for major organizational change: pain and remedy. 
The pain, which may come in the form of financial costs, layoffs, and/or overtime, 
appears between the present and the transition states. Remedies, actions that resolve 
problems or take advantage of an opportunity, occur between the transition and the 
desired state [Ref. 36:p. 97]. Too often in the DoD, the pain of transition is overlooked 
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by the promise of remedies. With the CIM initiative, it was the necessity for cost 
savings that got the program off the ground. In GAO report 91-18, CIM savings were 
estimated at $3.5 billion over fiscal years 1991 through 1995. $1.3 billion was to be 
set aside for new system development and the remaining $2.2 billion cut from the DoD 
IRM budget [Ref. 12:p. 3]. However, the report found that the savings estimates were 
based on the OSD staff's collective judgement, without the benefit of proper analysis. 
Even if the savings estimates had been accurate, cost savings cannot be the only way to 
gain support for change. The DoD itself cannot be blind to the realities, the "pain" 
associated with organizational change. In the case of CIM, the cost-saving remedies that 
got the initiative moving hindered its credibility in the long run when they failed to 
materialize. 
Conner provides the following six key principles for the process of change that will 
build resilience: 
1. Approach change as an unfolding process rather than a binary (either/or) 
event. 
2. Accept that change is expensive; whether early or late, the change will be 
costly. 
3. Believe that the status quo has become more expensive than the transition. 
4. Accept the discomfort of ambiguity as a natural reaction to transition. 
5. Accept only remedies that seem accessible. 
6. Consider the frame of reference in which the change is presented and 
understand the potential impact. 
[Ref. 36:p. 1 06] 
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D. THE ROLES OF CHANGE 
For the roles of change, Conner observes that the volatility of major organizational 
change makes it difficult to determine who will play the key roles. Yet, he does define 
four roles critical to the success of the change process. The sponsor is the individual or 
group that has the power to sanction or legitimize change. The agent is responsible for 
making the change happen. The target is the individual or group that must change, and 
the advocate is the individual or group who wants change but lacks the power to sanction 
it. [Ref. 36:p. 1 06] 
It is helpful to explain the relationship between these roles for the change effort to 
be successful. In Managing at the Speed of Change, Conner presents three basic forms 
these relationships have taken: linear, triangular and square; see Figure 5-2. 
Figure 5-2 Traditional Relationship [Ref. 36:p. 1 08] 
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-- _____________________________________ __j 
The linear relationship is the most traditional. The sponsor delegates the change 
responsibility to the agent who then deals directly with the target. Likewise the target 
reports to the agent and the agent to the sponsor [Ref. 36:p. 1 07]. In the triangular 
relationship, Figure 5-3, both the agent and the target report directly to the sponsor. 
ODR's research has found an 80 percent failure rate in organizations that attempt this 
relationship when implementing change [Ref. 36:p.1 08]. ODR attributes this failure 
rate to the sponsor's attempt at delegating authority to an agent not recognized by the 
target as having that authority. This relationship is visible in the services-versus-
DISA conflict. Until authority is vested in DISA, and successful examples can be 
displayed, the resistance from the services is likely to continue. 
Figure 5-3 Triangular Relationship [Ref. 36:p. 1 09] 
In the square relationship, Figure 5-4, both the agent and target report to a 
different sponsor. Again, ODR has usually found this relationship to be dysfunctional 
because the targets only recognize the authority of their respective sponsor. Thus, they 
60 
resist the agents' attempts at change because the agent lacks the authority to enforce 
change directives. 
Figure 5-4 Relationship with Dual Sponsors [Ref. 36:p. 111] 
The definition of roles and responsibilities is one of the greatest obstacles that must 
be overcome for CIM to succeed. Within the DoD, clearly defining roles of change are 
difficult; addressing their relationships are nearly impossible. The primary problem is 
defining a sponsor with the authority to make and enforce changes. The planning, 
programming, and budgeting system prevents even the highest levels of the DoD from 
exerting the control necessary to institute a change of CIM's magnitude. This barrier is 
not likely to be resolved in the foreseeable future, but by incremental implementation of 
process innovation, one functional area at a time, it may be possible to clearly define the 
necessary roles and responsibilities. On the scale at which the DoD is currently 
implementing CIM, there are too many advocates and not enough sponsors with the 
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proper authority. 
For the roles of change there are five ways to increase resilience: 
1 . Understand and recognize the key roles in a change. 
2. Understand the relationships between the key roles. 
3. Understand the requirements of a strong sponsor. 
4. Recognize that a change must be clearly and strongly sanctioned by those 
initiating and sustaining sponsorship positions. 
5. Perceive that the rhetoric of change is consistent with meaningful 
consequences. 
[Ref. 36:p. 122] 
E. RESISTANCE TO CHANGE 
Resistance to change, positive or negative, is a natural reaction to the disruption 
change causes. Conner believes that the ability and willingness of individuals are 
prerequisites for change. Ability is possessing the necessary skills and knowing how to 
apply them. Deficiencies in ability can be addressed through training and education. 
Willingness is the motivation to apply abilities. A lack of willingness can be overcome 
through a system of punishment and rewards [Ref. 36:pp. 127-128]. One key to 
overcoming resistance to change is anticipation. Noel Tichy, author of Managing 
Strategic Change: Technical, Political and Cultural Dynamics, recognizes that resistance 
to change can be due to habit, fear, absence of skills, unpredictability and sunk cost [Ref. 
37:p. 344-345]. Therefore, recognizing that resistance will accompany disruption to 
the norm enables managers of change to anticipate and minimize the resistance. Conner 
even encourages overt resistance (in the form of free discussion, etc.), for it is covert 
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resistance that managers are unable to aggressively pursue and overcome. 
Again, Conner provides five key principles to deal with resistance to change: 
1 . Understand the basic mechanisms of human resistance. 
2. View resistance as a natural and inevitable reaction to the disruption of 
expectations. 
3. Interpret resistance as a deficiency of either ability or willingness, and 
address it as such. 
4. Encourage and participate in overt expressions of resistance. 
5. Understand that resistance follows a sequence of events that can be anticipated 
and managed. 
[Ref. 36:p. 145] 
F. COMMITMENT TO CHANGE 
Davenport presents three qualities essential to the leadership of organizational 
change: commitment and the ability to inspire, conceptual skills, and impatience for 
results [Ref. 24:p. 178]. Of these three, commitment is the essential ingredient. The 
degree of commitment from senior leadership may be the single greatest factor for the 
success of change management. When involved in major organizational change, Conner 
recommends the following four principles that bolster the commitment to change: 
1. Realize the sequence in steps involved when committing to something new. 
2. Provide appropriate time and involvement to become emotionally and 
intellectually committed to change. 
3. Demonstration from the sponsor through the investment of time, resources, 
and effort. 
4. Understand that commitment to change is expensive, either through achieving 
it or avoiding it. [Ref. 36:p. 160] 
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G. CULTURE AND CHANGE 
Culture and change is Conner's sixth group of supporting principles. Not until 
recently, has corporate culture been recognized as having a profound influence on the 
outcome of any change effort. Now it is realized that the organization's culture is not 
only the most elusive element in the change process, but often the most difficult to 
change [Ref. 37:p. 352]. Conner attributes the most recent attention to corporate 
culture to increasing global competition, diminishing financial resources, obsolete 
technology, traditional and inadequate organizational structures, a disenchanted work 
force, and a demand for quality and customer service [Ref. 36:p. 162]. 
It appears that an organization's culture, to a great extent, determines the pace of 
change. For example, in the DoD, for example, there are numerous cultures and 
subcultures that exist. Change within any of these cultures will be viewed differently. 
Within the Navy, the addition of women into combat positions has met with far more 
resistance in the aviation communities than in other service communities. 
When involved in major organizational change, Conner recommends the following 
three principles that relate to organizational culture: 
1 . Understand the powerful effect culture has on the outcome of any major 
change effort. 
2. Know that major organizational change must be support by the organization's 
overall culture and its local subcultures. 
3. Recognize that when counterculture changes are introduced, you must alter 
the existing culture to support the new initiative. [Ref. 36:p. 178 
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H. SYNERGY 
Synergism is defined as the interaction of discrete agencies or agents such that the 
total effect is greater than the sum of the individual effects [Ref. 38:p. 1198]. Although, 
it is the seventh and last group of supporting principles in the change process, Conner 
refers to it as the "cornerstone" of managing change [Ref. 36:p. 184]. How the 
individuals or groups involved in the change effort relate to each other is an indication of 
the organizations collective ability to implement change. 
Within the DoD there are a number of cultural barriers to the teamwork exhibited 
by a synergistic organization. While the services share a common goal, there are 
traditional rivalries that are detrimental to synergy. Further, operational units tend to 
consider themselves a higher priority than the units that support them. These examples 
do not even approach the many non-synergistic elements between the services and the 
civilian agencies that support them. In any event, without positive interaction among 
all members of the DoD, synergy cannot exist. 
To foster positive interaction and guard against misunderstandings, Conner 
recommends three methods of interaction: effective communication, active listening and 
generating trust [Ref. 36:p. 202]. 
Conner's key principles to promote synergy in the change process are: 
1. Recognize how important synergy is to the success of change. 
2. Display a genuine willingness and ability to join with others in efforts to produce 
a synergistic equation. 
3. Listen, value and apply different perspectives. 




Having examined the CIM initiative, perspectives on reengineering and support 
principles that enable effective change management, it is now possible to draw some 
conclusions about, and make recommendations for, the DoD's reengineering effort. From 
its earliest beginnings with the ELG to the most recently released Strategic Plan the 
basic concept of CIM is sound: it is to redesign processes around their functions rather 
than by organizational boundaries, standardize requirements, and remove duplication to 
achieve greater efficiency. Reduced to its essence, CIM is a common-sense approach to 
information management. However, in its implementation, CIM has been forced to adapt 
to the bureaucracy of the DoD. Instead of making the DoD a more efficient organization, 
CIM has become another requirement to fulfill, another layer in the bureaucracy. 
Before the CIM initiative can be successful in the effort to reengineer the DoD, the 
following recommendations should be implemented: 
• The goals in the CIM Strategic Plan must reach and be understood by all 
members of the DoD. 
• Continuity in the overall mission of the CIM initiative must be ascertained. 
• There must a central authority to enforce policy and to prioritize CIM related 
initiatives. 
• Executive level commitment must be demonstrated. 
• The services must accept and support the changes CIM will create. 
• The DoD must use consistent economic analyses throughout the DoD to 
determine what changes will be necessary. 
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• The DoD must learn to manage change 
• Examples of process innovation from within the DoD should be used to foster 
support throughout the DoD. 
To a large extent, ASD(C31) is now functioning as the DoD's CIO. As a member of the 
El Executive Board and the El Management Council, this role is reinforced. However, 
given the magnitude of CIM and the scope of the Secretary's present duties it appears 
more practical to appoint a CIO at the ASD level or higher if possible. Success of the CIM 
initiative hinges on the DoD leadership's ability to integrate and manage a variety of 
programs across organizational units. By tasking the current ASD(C31) office with this 
undertaking, the DoD is not looking beyond its traditional organizational structure. 
The DoD's CIO-which could be called the ASD for Information Management-should be 
filled from the private sector - possibly one of the original members of the ELG. 
Currently, neither the El Executive Board nor the El Management Council has the benefit 
of the perspective of an expert in the field of information management from outside the 
DoD. 
In addition to the appointment of a CIO and the use of outside talent, the DoD should 
attempt process innovation in a single functional area as opposed to a concurrent, 
department-wide effort. While the DoD may posses the resources to attempt 
implementation on a department-wide scale, Davenport's high-impact (selective) 
approach is more practical and less risky. Moreover, the DoD is hardly the type of 
dynamic organization designed to handle the magnitude of disruption a change on a 
department-wide scale would cause. 
If successful examples of the CIM can be demonstrated, more support can be gained at 
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all levels of the department. Central to building this support is guaranteeing security to 
all of the DoD's employees-obviously no small task. But as the CIM initiative is 
incrementally implemented, it may be necessary to reach the desired personnel levels 
through voluntary separations. 
It is also necessary to specifically address the problem of service allegiances-a 
major obstacle to CIM implementation. Each of the services is threatened by the loss of 
control of functions that have historically been theirs to manage. At the level of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, each service chief is expected to have and voice opinions parochial 
to his service. An article, by Peter Chiarelli, in the Autumn, 1993 issue of Joint Force 
Quarterly, advocated the formation of a National Military Advisory Council (NMAC) to 
replace the JCS. The reform, originally proposed by General Edward Meyer, former 
Army Chief of Staff, proposed that 
NMAC [would be] composed of senior flag officers from each service, plus one 
civilian and the Chairman. NMAC members would be distinguished retired or 
active four-star flag or general officers serving on terminal assignments. 
[Ref. 6:p. 72] 
While that reform never came about, it should be revisited in view of CIM. Abolishing 
the JCS is unrealistic, but the advisory council or similar positions could be added to the 
El Corporate Management Council. Ideally, these members could represent the best 
interest of the services from a non-partisan standpoint. This would serve to alleviate 
some of the partisanship the services now display. Of further benefit, the positions, 
which would be recommended by the JCS, could run counter to the election years. This 
would make the council less susceptible to the political turmoil during changes in 
administrations and thus bolster the continuity of mission. 
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B. CONCLUSION 
The CIM initiative is already under scrutiny of the GAO and many other agencies, 
internal and external to the DoD. Congress, on more than one occasion has threatened to 
reduce or stop funding if the CIM initiative does not demonstrate notable savings. While 
the CIM Strategic Plan is a step in the right direction, the recommendations listed above 
can also be considered measures necessary to ensure CIM's survival. Should the DoD 
continue its attempt at haphazard and unsupported implementation the initiative is 
destined to fail. If the recurring problems addressed in this paper do not receive prompt 
and appropriate attention, the initiative is also likely to fail to achieve the desired 
results. 
Despite the shortcomings of the Strategic Plan, CIM remains the most feasible 
vehicle for changing the DoD. However, the shortcomings described in this paper should 
be addressed immediately. If the recommendations are successfully implemented in 
conjunction with the CIM Strategic Plan, its chances of acceptance across the DoD 
increase. Whether it is labeled reengineering, process innovation, process redesign, or 
CIM, the task is the same: to fundamentally examine the core processes that are 
performed to accomplish our missions, with the aim of increasing efficiency and use of 
fewer resources. As the missions of the DoD increase in diversity and scope, its 
resources will have to be managed better. The dramatic improvements required of our 
forces demand a commitment to the total redesign of current policies, organizational 
structure, culture and systems. 
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